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Abstract: Service-oriented applications are frequently used in highly dynamic contexts: ser-
vice compositions may change dynamically, in particular, because new services are discovered at
runtime. Moreover, subtyping has recently been identified as a strong requirement for service dis-
covery. Correctness guarantees over service compositions, provided in particular by type systems,
are highly desirable in this context. However, while service oriented applications can be built using
various technologies and protocols, none of them provides decent support ensuring that well-typed
services cannot go wrong. An emitted message, for instance, may be dangling and remain as a
ghost message in the network if there is no agent to receive it. In this article, we introduce a
formal model for service compositions and define a type system with subtyping that ensures type
soundness by combining static and dynamic checks. We also demonstrate how to preserve type
soundness in presence of malicious agents and insecure communication channels.
Key-words: Formal Methods, Service-Oriented Computing, Type System, Type Soundness,
Message Authentication
∗This work has been partially supported by the CESSA ANR project (ANR 09-SEGI-002-01, see
http://cessa.gforge.inria.fr).
Pas de message fantôme avec des services bien typés
Résumé : Les applications orientées services (SOA) sont hautement dynamiques car la con-
naissance et la topologie des services évoluent au cours du temps. La découverte dynamique
des services est une facilité importante des SOA, sa flexibilité et sa puissance d’utilisation a
été récemment accrue par l’introduction d’une notion de sous-typage. Dans un tel contexte des
garanties sur la composition des services est un besoin crucial pour le passage à l’échelle. Les
systèmes de types sont connus dans le contexte de la programmation pour permettre certaines
garanties minimales. Toutefois, les technologies actuelles des services sont très hétérogènes, et
aucune proposition n’a vraiment été faite pour un système de type décent. Un tel système de
type doit supporter des canaux de première classe, une relation de sous-typage et assurer qu’un
message émis ne restera pas un fantôme dans le réseau de communication. Un message fantôme
est un message émis qui ne vérifierait pas le contrat minimal pour être reçu par un agent et
se trouve donc à demeurer éternellement dans le réseau. Dans cet article nous introduisons un
modèle formel pour des services indépendant de leur orchestration et nous définissons un système
de type sémantique. Ce modèle avec son système de type assure une propriété de correction :
tous les messages émis par un agent pourront être reçus par l’agent destinataire. Nous prouvons
également que cette propriété est satisfaite dans des contextes où certains agents ne sont pas
fiables et en présence de canaux de communications non sûrs.
Mots-clés : Méthodes formelles, calcul orienté service, système de type, sûreté du typage,
authentification des messages
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Figure 1: Bank transfer scenario: typing problems entail security issues
1 Introduction
Service-oriented applications are frequently used in highly dynamic contexts: service composi-
tions may be modified and new services be discovered at runtime. Guaranteeing the correctness
of service applications in such highly-dynamic contexts is an important open research issue.
This problem is compounded by the multiples models and technologies (e.g., WS-* and RESTful
models, RPC-XML, JSON-RPC protocols, Apache’s CXF and Axis infrastructures) from which
SOAs are built, typically in a complex manner that provides only very few guarantees concerning
security and safety properties of the resulting software systems.
Type checking is a well-known and proven means to (statically or dynamically) support
correctness properties, such as stronger security properties and more efficient program executions,
notably for compositional approaches to software development. However, none of the above
frameworks or technologies provide decent support for type-based services, such that well-typed
services cannot go wrong. For instance, JSON supports typing only in terms of object concepts
but not in terms of services. Unfortunately, class subtyping and message subtyping may be
incompatible: an object may have, e.g., a single value for each field while a message may define
parameters several times (which has been exploited, e.g., for XML injection attacks). The lack
of support of type systems for service-oriented systems [11, 12] and a notion of subtyping, in
particular, has recently been recognized in several different contexts [8, 6]; type system would be
useful, in particular, in order to enable required services to be provided by more specific ones.
Figure 1 shows a realistic scenario that illustrates how typing problems in existing web service
standards may entail security issues in the context of communication between a client, say C,
and a bank B. B expects data to be encrypted during this communication, e.g., waits for
data representing transaction numbers of type Encrypted_Number, a subtype of plain numbers
Number. C may not know the specific service of B and, by default, assume that the service is not
security sensitive and may be performed using plain data, i.e., using a channel of type <Number>.
Using the WS-Discovery protocol, C then contacts a registry service R in order to get access,
i.e., discover, B’s service. Following this standard, C must send an identifier for the bank of type
QName to R (on the channel P, see Fig. 1). Via channel D, R returns to C a channel K that has
been provided by the bank and that should be used for communication between C and B. The
WS-Discovery standard does not provide channel types: C just gets the information that K is of
a (generic) channel type that is compatible with sending of plain data, e.g., sending of data of
type Number. C thus sends unencrypted data B who will recognize the (type) error and inform
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C. However, this type error obviously causes a security issue: the unencrypted data initially sent
from C to B may be read during transit by some malicious third party.
This kind of typing problem and corresponding security issue can be avoided if R provided a
properly typed channel to C. The registry would have to support type-checking with subtyping
to enable required services to be provided by more specific ones. This requires, in turn, that
contravariant channels are used: if a service with type < T1 > is required, a type < T2 > of a
service is a correct service provider (i.e., < T2 > is a subtype of < T1 >) if T1 is a subtype of T2.
In the above scenario, the registry would send a channel K of type < Encrypted > to the client
who would then recognize a problem: the type of K is not a subtype of channel type < Number >
(which C assumed) because Encrypted is a subtype of Number. In order to avoid that R sends
an ill-typed service, C must send not only the name of the service but also the (correctly typed)
channel D that is used by the registry to return the service channel to C: the channel P must
therefore be typed with < QName × << Number >>>, the name and type of D, instead of just
< QName >; the type of D, << Number >>, ensures that the channel sent by R has the expected
type by C. With this new type information, the registry would then know that C expects to
send plain data, which is incompatible with the encrypted communication required by the bank
B. Hence, the unencrypted sending of transaction information would be avoided.
While this scenario is set in the context of service discovery using WS-Discovery, the under-
lying problems are of a general nature.
In this paper, we provide the following contributions:
• A black-box model for service interactions that abstracts from implementation details and
differences of existing web service technologies. This model supports message-oriented
services in the presence of channel discovery and subtyping. It is formalized in terms of a
chemical semantics.
• We define, to the best of our knowledge, the first type system for service interactions that
relies on the principles of semantic subtyping [4] and supports subtyping as well as type
interference of first-class channels. This type system supports a more regular and general
definition of set operators than previous ones, notably Carpineti’s and Laneve’s system [3].
• We present the extension of the type system in a context with malicious agents. A safe
typing requires authentication and we show the correctness of the authentication model, as
well as the soundness of the extended type system in the presence of attackers and insecure
channels.
This article is structured as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce our model for message-passing
services. Sec. 3 presents a type system for messages that contain structured values. We apply
our functional model and the type system to different applications related to common security
issues in Sec. 4. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 5 and conclude this article.
2 A model for services with first-order channels
We first define a formal model for service interaction and service composition. Our model belongs
to the class of message-passing models [7]: agents send and receive messages in a completely
asynchronous manner using buffers; they do not share memory. In the absence of failure, messages
are eventually delivered but no assumption is made about the time needed for delivery. The
network is modeled through the message buffers, which are represented as multisets of messages
(i.e., messages are unordered) of arbitrary but finite length. A channel contains one message at
a time and determines its (unique) target. Agents also execute in a completely asynchronous
Inria
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fashion: agents are truly concurrent, each proceeding at its local speed. Exchanging messages
is therefore the only way to coordinate agents. Initially, coordination is only possible between
agents that share a channel, for instance between a server providing a channel and its clients
that share the channel. Gradually, agents may discover new channels since messages can contain
channels: channel mobility allows the network topology to evolve.
We abstract from the contents of messages by means of a type system. We assume the
existence of a set V of values, a set K of channels and a function K : V → 2K that maps each
value v to the set K(v) of channels occurring in v. The two main requirements of our model,
asynchronous communication and true concurrency, have led us to resort to a chemical model [1],
which is frequently used for the formalization of such models. In the following, we first define
the syntax of the model, which describes processes built from agents, molecules and the solution,
called aether, containing them. Semantic rules then describe how the aether evolves in terms of
structural rules and reduction rules.
Processes and Agents
p ::= a[σ][I] | p ‖ p
I ::= O | I & cio
cio ::= kι | ko
a ∈ A
σ ∈ Σ
k ∈ K
Aether
Ω ::= 〈−→µ 〉
µ ::= p | a[σ] | a[cio] | a[mio] | k(v)
mio ::= kι(v) | ko(v)
Figure 2: Model syntax
Processes are described on the left-hand side of Figure 2. A process p consists of a parallel
composition of agents. An agent has a name a, a state σ and an interface I. The state of agents
is kept abstract: their implementation is hidden. Different formalisms, like process algebras,
could therefore be used to model agents. An interface declares (the names of) input and output
channels. Input channels kι correspond to the channels provided by the agent: input messages
are received on these channels. Output channels ko correspond to the channels that go out of
the agent, either as a proper message channel or as part of the contents of a message. A process
may obey restrictions on agent names and input channels in order to be well-formed:
Definition 1 (Process well-formedness) A process must satisfy two rules to be well-formed:
1. Agent Identification: given an agent name a, there is at most one agent with name a.
2. Channel Univocality: given a channel k, there is at most one occurrence of input channel
kι.
Agents interact via the (network) aether Ω that is defined on the right-hand side of Figure 2.
A process that is deployed in the aether is called a molecule. Molecules can be decomposed
into smaller ones. While the aether evolves through reduction, (light) mobile molecules appear
that represent values transmitted by a channel. Light molecules correspond to output messages
emitted by agents, messages in transit and input messages that are to be received by agents. As
different messages can have exactly the same form (same channel, same contents), the aether is
defined as a multiset of molecules.
Structural Rules. The structural rules given in Fig. 3 essentially describe the decomposition
of processes in the aether. Applied from left to right as reduction rules they converge to a
RR n° 7899
6 Allam & Douence & Grall & Royer & Südholt
p1 ‖ p2 
 p1 , p2
a[σ][I & cio] 
 a[σ][I] , a[cio]
a[σ][O] 
 a[σ]
Figure 3: Aether: structural rules
normal form. When used from left to right they are called fission (or heating) rules, used from
right to left they are called fusion (or cooling) rules. The structural rules repeatedly reduce
parallel processes to molecules until they have been reduced to individual agents. The interfaces
of agents are then decomposed, to finally yield agents with their associated states and a multiset
of molecules describing the local (input or output) channels of agents. Besides structural rules,
we use two standard inference rules that are common to all chemical abstract machines [1], the
reaction law that allows schemata to be instantiated in an aether, and the chemical law that
defines how local reactions are fired in an aether.
−→
l −→ −→r
〈−→l[σ] 〉−→ 〈−−→r[σ] 〉 reaction law
S −→ S′
S + S′′ −→ S′ + S′′ chemical law
Figure 4: Chemical and reaction laws
The reaction laws states that rules are in fact schemata which can be instantiated as soon
as there are in the aether molecules which match the patterns of the rules. The chemical law
means that any reaction can be performed freely in any solution.
Reduction rules (see Figure 5) describe the, typically irreversible, evolution of the aether.
They assume that the aether has been transformed by structural rules into normal form.
• Rule [LOC] : Agent a consumes a, possibly empty, multiset of input messages min, and
produces another, possibly empty, multiset of output messages mout, and updates its state
from σ1 to σ2.
• Rule [OUT] : Agent a sends the message k(v) over the network. A local condition must be
met: all the channels occurring in the message ({k}∪K(v)) must be output channels (−−→cout)
declared by the agent.
• Rule [IN] : Agent a receives message k(v) from the network. A local condition must be
met: the message channel k must be declared as an input channel by the agent. Moreover,
the agent upgrades its declaration of output channels by adding all the channels discovered
in the content v of the message (K(v)).
Actually, these three rules correspond to axiom schemata. More precisely, the rules [IN] and
[OUT] are true schemata, whereas the rule [LOC] is a generic form for specifying schemata: with
each agent comes a set of schemata having the form [LOC] and defining the local behavior of the
agent. The axioms are therefore parametrized by the definition of agents.
An error happens when a message is dangling in the aether, that is, no agent can receive
this message because there is no corresponding input channel. We require a notion of interface
consistency, which informally states that for each required channel there is a corresponding and
compliant provided channel defined by an agent. A first simple result can then be shown: during
aether execution no dangling messages occur.
Inria
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[LOC] a[σ1] ,
−−−−→
a[min] −→ a[σ2] ,
−−−−→
a[mout]
[OUT] a[ko(v)] , a[ko] ,
−−−−→
a[cout] −→ k(v) , a[ko] ,
−−−−→
a[cout]
−−→
cout = K(v)
[IN] k(v) , a[kι] −→ a[kι(v)] , a[kι] ,
−−−−→
a[cout]
−−→
cout = K(v)
Figure 5: Aether: reduction rules
3 The type system
We now introduce a type system for the values carried by services, i.e., for the untyped model
of the previous section. The values are constructed according to the following rules:
v ::= b | l[v], v | k
A value v is either a primitive value b or a labeled term l[v], v (that can be used, e.g., to
construct sequences of values) or a channel k. The syntax for types is built from value constructors
(l[_],_) and a constructor for channels < _ >. It includes the classic set operations (+,∧ and
¬).
t ::= B | l[t], t | < t > | t+ t | t ∧ t | ¬t | µX.t | X
where each base type B denotes a set of values b. Note that (recursive) types may be
unfolded infinitely many times, but values are finite. Some recursive types are not constructive
(e.g., µX.X); we therefore consider only guarded types: a constructor l[_],_ or < _ > must
occur between any binder µX and an occurrence of the variable X.
3.1 Semantic typing relation
Figure 6 defines the typing relation S (and its negation S) semantically, that is, in terms of set-
theoretic concepts [4]. A value b is of type B when it belongs to the set of possible values (rule
Base1) and conversely (rule Base2). A labeled value l[v1], v2 is of type l[t1], t2 when its subterms
are of type t1 and t2 (rule Lab1). It is not of the labeled type when one of its subterms is not of
the right type (rules Lab2 and rule Lab3) or when the value is not properly labeled (rule Lab4). A
value k is of channel type < t > when k is a channel and its values have the right type (rule Ch1),
where Γ(k) denotes the type declared by the channel k. Note that, for the sake of readability,
we use a logical implication ⇒ in the premise of this rule: actually ∀v.v S t⇒ v S Γ(k) means
∀v.(v S t) ∨ (v S Γ(k)). Conversely, a value is not of channel type when there is a mismatch
with its declared type (rule Ch2) or when the value is not a channel (rule Ch3). Union and
intersection of types is defined directly in terms on the corresponding set-theoretic operators.
For instance, a value is of type t1 + t2 if it is of type t1 or t2, and conversely it is not of the
union type if it is of neither type. Negation of types is defined by negation of the typing relation.
Finally, recursive type definitions are unfolded in order to define their semantics. We consider
guarded types only: between a location µX and all occurrences of the variable X, there is a
constructor l[_],_ or < _ >. Recursive types thus cannot be unfolded infinitely many times.
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b ∈ B
Base1
b S B
v /∈ B
Base2
v S B
v1 S t1 v2 S t2
Lab1
l[v1], v2 S l[t1], t2
v1 S t1
Lab2
l[v1], v2 S l[t1], t2
v2 S t2
Lab3
l[v1], v2 S l[t1], t2
v /∈ l[v1], v2
Lab4
v S l[t1], t2
∀v.v S t⇒ v S Γ(k)
Ch1
k S < t >
v S t v S Γ(k)
Ch2
k S < t >
v /∈ k
Ch3
v S < t >
v S t1
Union1
v S t1 + t2
v S t2
Union2
v S t1 + t2
v S t1 v S t2
Union3
v S t1 + t2
v S t1 v S t2
Inter1
v S t1 ∧ t2
v S t1
Inter2
v S t1 ∧ t2
v S t2
Inter3
v S t1 ∧ t2
v S t
Not1
v S ¬t
v S t
Not2
v S ¬t
v S t[µX.t/X]
Rec1
v S µX.t
v S t[µX.t/X]
Rec2
v S µX.t
Figure 6: Semantic typing relation S and its negation S.
Since this typing scheme only defines types for values and is not related to any reduction
relation, type soundness in the usual sense does not apply here. However, the type system is
complete in the following sense.
Theorem 1 (Completeness of the Type System) Consider the type system defined in Fig. 6.
Then for any value v and any type t, we can derive that value v has type t or that value v does
not have type t:
∀v.∀t. v S t ∨ v S t.
Proof. Indeed, it is possible to coinductively build a proof of v S t or v S t. 
However, as defined, the type system is not consistent. For instance, consider a system with a
unique channel k with type t equal to µX. < X >. It is easy to show that the judgements k S t
and k S t are both valid. To avoid this inconsistency, we modify the type system by adding a
constraint (following the formal framework introduced by Brandt and Henglein [2]). Thus, on
any path in the proof, the rule Ch2 may be applied only a finite number of times. Intuitively,
a refutation involves a finite number of communications. Formally, we now consider judgements
∆ ` v S t, where the environment ∆ is a sequence of typing judgements (k S t) or (k S t) for
channels. The environment ∆ accounts for the application of rules Ch1 and Ch2. Indeed, these
Inria
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two rules are now defined as follows.
∀v.(∆ + (k S < t >)) ` v S t⇒ (∆ + (k S < t >)) ` v S Γ(k)
((k S < t >) /∈ ∆) Ch1
∆ ` k S < t >
(∆ + (k S < t >)) ` v S t (∆ + (k S < t >)) ` v S Γ(k)
((k S < t >) /∈ ∆) Ch2
∆ ` k S < t >
The environment (∆ + J) is an extension of ∆ with J , defined if J does not occur in ∆. We
also add an axiom allowing infinite proofs to be defined for judgements k S < t >.
(k S < t >) ∈ ∆
Ch′1
∆ ` k S < t >
The absence of a dual axiom for (k S < t >) means that the type system forbids the generation
of an infinite proof from such a refutation judgment. The whole system is finally obtained by
combining the previous three rules, Ch1, Ch′1 and Ch2, with the other rules, kept unchanged
(except that the environment ∆ is passed from the premises to the conclusion). Thanks to rule
Ch′1 and the guard condition, the new type system is inductively interpreted.
With the new type system, we can check that (k S µX. < X >) cannot be proved. The
following theorem shows that the type system ensures consistency while preserving completeness.
Theorem 2 (Consistency and Completeness of the Type System) The extended type sys-
tem is consistent:
∀v.∀t. ¬(v S t ∧ v S t).
The extended type system is complete as well:
∀v.∀t. v S t ∨ v S t.
Proof. For consistency, we can proceed by induction over the typing judgments to prove that
assuming (v S t ∧ v S t) leads to a contradiction.
For completeness, we can progressively build in parallel the proof of v S t and v S t, in
a top-down manner. The proofs are dual, with the same structure. By consistency, the first
one succeeds if and only if the second one fails. Now we prove that the proof generation ends
with either a success or a failure. Consider a path in the proof in construction, and assume for
a contradiction that the path is infinite. Because of the guard condition, the rules Labi; i ∈
{1, . . . , 4} or Ch are infinitely often applied. If one of the rules Labi is infinitely often applied,
the values occuring in the judgements infinitely decrease, contradiction. Otherwise, the rule Ch
is applied infinitely often. Since the types are regular and the set of channels is finite, at some
rank in the path, the condition (k S < t >) ∈ ∆ or (k S < t >) ∈ ∆ is met, for some judgement
(k S < t >) or (k S < t >). This is a contradiction. Finally, thanks to the guard condition,
the regularity of types, the finiteness of the set of channels and the definition of rules Ch1, Ch′1
and Ch2 in the extended type system, each proof either succeeds or fails. 
3.2 Algorithms
Two algorithms are needed in order to support our type system: an algorithm that checks
whether two types are in a subtyping relation (_ ≤ _) and a type interference algorithm. Type
interference is needed in order to define the types channels that are sent over the network
RR n° 7899
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t ≤ r ⇐⇒ < r > ≤ < t > (1)
< t1 > + < t2 > ≤ < t1 ∧ t2 > (2)
< t1 + t2 > ∼= < t1 > ∧ < t2 > (3)
Figure 7: Channel type equations
3.2.1 Subtyping algorithm
Our algorithm for subtype checking follows Castagna and Frisch [4] who have shown how to
derive such an algorithm from a semantic type system. The grammar of our type system is
close to theirs. The main difference is that we support labeled lists and channels instead of
functions. A channel can be viewed, however, as a function of type t −→ ⊥1, and even our
calculus can encode first class function. Types are interpreted as sets and a disjunctive normal
form exists for type expressions. The idea of the algorithm for subtype checking is to express
subtyping as set inclusion and use an emptiness test on disjunctive normal forms to decide
subtyping. One point is that the complexity of this algorithm is rather bad, exponential in the
size of the types. Optimizations to this algorithm that are practically relevant have already been
proposed, notably in the context of the CDuce language (http://www.cduce.org). Another way
to optimize this algorithm is to consider restrictions on the types, notably by giving up the full
power of set-theoretic type constructors (union, intersection, negation) as done by Carpineti and
Laneve [3] who provide a polynomial subtype algorithm. Concretely, the exponential complexity
of subtyping of semantic types comes from the availability of the disjoint union operators on
different lists that are labelled with the same label. Carpineti and Laneve therefore restrict the
grammar to prevent union of types to have the same starting label. But the counterpart is a type
language which is not as regular as ours. We do not detail the subtype check any further here
but refer the reader to Castagna’s and Frisch’s work [4] for details. The optimization techniques
mentioned above are also applicable to our typing scheme.
Note that we use one important assumption which is called
Definition 2 (Universality) ∀t . ∃kt . Γ(k) = t.
This property implies another classic one: all channel types are inhabited.
3.2.2 Type inference
Type interference is crucial in the context of typed web service if, as in our case, values may be
sent without type information or with type information that may have been constructed by a
malicious agent. In the remainder of this section we first present several equations that relate
channel types and then the type inference algorithms itself whose correctness proof relies on the
equations relating channel types.
Some channel type equations. Figure 7 shows some equations that relate expressions in-
volving channel types. Because of channel contravariance (mostly), computations with channel
types may be surprising at first sight: union and intersection, for example, are not symmetric.
Furthermore, the subtyping relations can normally not be replaced by equalities. Note that, in
the following proofs we use only the original rules Ch1 and Ch2 but our deductions are sound
since we never apply Ch2 an infinite number of times.
1This correspondence supports the need for contravariant channel types.
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In order to prove the above relationships, the premises of rules Ch1 and Ch2 from Fig. 6 can
be expressed as, respectively, one of two conditions:
• t ≤ Γ(k) or t ∧ ¬Γ(k) = ⊥ (which shows the contravariant effect)
• ¬(t ≤ Γ(k)) or t ∧ ¬Γ(k) 6= ⊥
Here, t ≤ Γ(k) and ¬(t ≤ Γ(k)) simply are reformulations of the subtype relationships; the other
two terms simply correspond to tests whether the intersection of t and Γ(k) is empty or not
(remember that semantic typing schemes define subtyping as subset relationships).
The proofs of the last properties in Figure 7 are straightforward using the previous four
auxiliary properties.
For proving equation (1) we have < r > ≤ < t > ⇐⇒ ∃Γ . (k S < r > =⇒ k S < t >).
Thus if we have t ≤ r then < r > ≤ < t > is true for this typing context. The reverse
implication is not immediate from the S system, it comes from the universality property. But
let Γ a typing context, < r > ≤ < t > implies that ∀k . k S < r > r =⇒ k S < t > and
then ∀k . r ≤ Γ(k) =⇒ t ≤ Γ(k). The previous property (2) states that kr S < r > is true
it means that Γ(k) = r and then t ≤ r. This is a really important equivalence and one of its
consequences is that the channel type functor is injective.
t = r ⇐⇒ < r > = < t > (4)
The inference algorithm. In the following we define an algorithm that enables correct types
of transmitted values to be inferred by receiving agents. The algorithm principle is similar to
pattern matching: in our case a value v is used as a pattern that filters a type t. Type inference
is defined by an inductively defined function [[_; _ ]] given in Fig. 8. This function has type
Value × Type −→ boolean × Context takes an argument, a pair of a value and a type, and
returns a pair consisting of a boolean that indicates whether the type matches the value and
an inferred context, a mapping from channels to types.2 In the following, we use the notations
succeed and context for the projections or the result pair boolean × Context. The notation
context([[_; _ ]])(k) denotes the type of k inferred by the algorithm.
Types (that appear in the leftmost column of Fig. 8) are closed and must respect the guarded
type constraint. Values (see the top line of Fig. 8) are finite and represented by closed terms.
Failure is noted (false, {}), where {} denotes the empty context. Operations like intersection
and union are promoted to inferred contexts as follows. A union fails if both of its arguments
fail while an intersection fails if one of its argument fails. If both arguments of a union or
intersection match successfully, the union of the resulting bindings is caculated, whereby bindings
occurring in both arguments are merged as defined below. The notation un(_) stands for the
unfolding of a recursive type and _?_ : _ is a shortcut for if _ then _ else _. We also define
>v = {k : > | k ∈ dom(v)}.
The intersection (∧) and union (+) of inferred contexts with merging are formally defined as
follows.
Definition 3 (Merging inferred contexts)
dom(Θ1 ∧ Θ2) = dom(Θ1 + Θ2) = dom(Θ1) + dom(Θ2)
∀k . k ∈ ( dom(Θ1) ∧ dom(Θ2)) =⇒ (Θ1 ∧ Θ2)(k) = Θ1(k) ∧ Θ2(k)
∀k . k ∈ ( dom(Θ1) ∧ ¬dom(Θ2)) =⇒ (Θ1 ∧ Θ2)(k) = (Θ1 + Θ2)(k) = Θ1(k)
∀k . k ∈ (¬dom(Θ1) ∧ dom(Θ2)) =⇒ (Θ1 ∧ Θ2)(k) = (Θ1 + Θ2)(k) = Θ2(k)
∀k . k ∈ ( dom(Θ1) + dom(Θ2)) =⇒ (Θ1 + Θ2)(k) = Θ1(k) + Θ2(k)
2Note that the inferred context is different from the typing context Γ used for type checking before.
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[[ t; v ]] = b k l′[v1], v2
B (b ∈ B, {}) (false, {}) (false, {})
¬B (b /∈ B, {}) (true, {k : ¬B}) (true,>v)
< t > (false, {}) (true, {k :< t >}) (false, {})
¬ < t > (true, {}) (true, {k : ¬ < t >}) (true,>v)
l[t1], t2 (false, {}) (false, {})
(l = l′, {})∧
[[ t1; v1 ]] ∧ [[ t2; v2 ]]
¬l[t1], t2 (true, {}) (true, {k : ¬l[t1], t2})
(l = l′)?
[[¬t1; v1 ]] + [[¬t2; v2 ]]
: (true,>v)
¬¬t [[ t; v ]]
t1 + t2 [[ t1; v ]] + [[ t2; v ]]
¬(t1 + t2) [[¬t1; v ]] ∧ [[¬t2; v ]]
t1 ∧ t2 [[ t1; v ]] ∧ [[ t2; v ]]
¬(t1 ∧ t2) [[¬t1; v ]] + [[¬t2; v ]]
µX.t [[un(µX.t); v ]]
¬µX.t [[¬un(µX.t); v ]]
Figure 8: Inference algorithm
It is easy to see that dom(context([[ t; v ]])) ⊆ K(v). This inclusion may be strict for some
v: sometimes the above algorithm infers partial types for channels because it does not dispose
of precise-enough information. For instance, for the application [[¬int; l[k], k ]] the value l[k], k
is matched by the type ¬int but it is not possible to assign a type to the channel k. The above
algorithm may also assign a non-usable type to a channel, for instance k : ¬bool. In such cases,
the algorithm cannot be effective since we have no positive information about which type of data
circulates on the channel. The algorithm can also build types for channel like < B1 > + < B2 >
or < B1 > ∧ < B2 > which should be interpreted depending on the base type semantics. Finally,
there are some cases where the inferred channel is the “top” channel type. Consider, for instance,
[[< int > + < bool >; k ]] then k :< int > + < bool > which is a subtype of k :< int∧ bool > and
we can expect that this intersection is empty. The principles of subtyping checking used in [4]
can be applied to solve this issue.
We now turn to the correctness proof of our type inference algorithm. First, we prove its
termination. We then show one property, Propositions 2, that establishes the compatibility of
type inference and the typing checking system S, S¯.
Proposition 1 (Termination of type inference) The function [[ t; v ]] terminates for all in-
put values t and v.
Proof. By contradiction. If the type interference function does not terminate, it is applied
an infinite number of times. The corresponding infinite sequence of applications cannot be an
infinite chain of consecutive calls with unfolding due to the guardedness condition. Furthermore,
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the cases of union and intersection can only be performed a finite number of times because the
structural complexity of the corresponding type argument t is strictly decreasing. In all remaining
cases the structural complexity of the value argument v in the sequence of applications strictly
decreases. Thus no infinite chain of applications of the type inference function exists. 
The following property shows that type inference is, if it yields a matching type, equivalent
to type checking using the system S, S¯.
Proposition 2 (Equivalence of inference and typing)
∀v, t . succeed([[ t; v ]]) ⇐⇒ ∃Γ . Γ ` v S t
See Section A for the proof.
Another property links (successful) inference and subtyping
Proposition 3 (Successful inference and subtyping)
∀t, v . t ≤ r ∧ succeed([[ t; v ]]) =⇒ succeed([[ r; v ]]).
Proof. Consider the semantic typing definition t ≤ r =⇒ (v S t =⇒ v S r). If
succeed([[ t; v ]]), Prop. 2 yields a typing context ∃Γ . Γ ` v S t that is also a typing context for
r, hence Prop. 2 then implies that inference succeeds for r. 
Our inference algorithm infers correct channel type:
Proposition 4 (Correctness of channel type inference)
∀t, k . succeed([[ t; k ]]) =⇒ context([[ t; k ]])(k) = t
Proof. We proceed by induction on the type t. The ases for B, l[t1], t2 and < t1 > and their
negations satisfy the proposition straightforwardly. The case ¬¬ is solved by induction. For
union and intersection we apply the induction hypothesis and the corresponding set operations
on the inferred types. For recursion, we unfold a finite number of times until one of the other
cases is attained and then apply the induction hypothesis. 
Finally, we show that inference is monotonic with respect to subtyping, another property
that is crucial for the correctness of web service compositions.
Definition 4 (Inferred context subtyping) Let Θt and Θr two inferred contexts, inferred
context subtyping is defined as Θt ≤ Θr iff ∀k . k ∈ dom(Θt) =⇒ Θt(k) ≤ Θr(k).
Proposition 5 (Monotonicity of inference w.r.t. subtyping)
∀t, r, v . (t ≤ r ∧ succeed([[ t; v ]])) =⇒ (context([[ t; v ]]) ≤ context([[ r; v ]]))
See Section A for the proof.
4 Application to message-oriented services
This section presents an application of our service interaction model and its type system to several
issues related to the protection of agents that may communicate channels within messages. We
first show that the type system ensures that all messages can always be received by some agent,
i.e., that messages don’t get stuck. We then consider networks in which some agents may engage
in malicious activity or use insecure channels while other parts of the network are trustworthy
agents. In this context, we define a message authentication scheme and show how messages can
be protected so that malicious agents cannot tamper with message types. Finally, we prove that
all messages sent by a controlled agent to another controlled agent will be delivered correctly.
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4.1 Type checking messages
In a first step we show type soundness in the presence of benign agents and secure channels.
If a message is received that does not contain a channel that is unknown at the receiving site,
a type-check performed during emission is sufficient to ensure correct delivery. However, since
services may be discovered dynamically, the type of unknown channels must be inferred using a
type inference system, such as that presented in Sec. 3. Structural subtyping for types has to be
used since this is important for interoperability as explained in [8]. Furthermore, it is necessary
to check that provided and required interfaces are compliant. We ensure compliance using the
subtyping algorithm that is part of our type system.
To type check service interactions we enrich our model of service interactions introduced in
Sec. 2 with type information and declarations: interfaces are enriched with type declarations for
channels and Θ is used to refer to inferred context as in introduced in the previous section. We
consider an additional (third) property for well-formed process (see Def. 1): a sequence
−−→
cout of
typed output channels of a well-formed process defines a functional relation from channels to
types. Thus we see it as a local context and we will note Θe.
Practically, we need a checking algorithm and an inference algorithm since we should distin-
guish emission of a value and its receipt. Application of the inference algorithm will be noted
[[ t; v ]] = (b,Θi), where b is a boolean and Θi the inferred context. The type checking is realized
with inference and subtyping, a more dedicated algorithm is possible but it is an implementation
choice. In order to formalize interface consistency and type soundness, we first define the notion
of receivable and dangling messages. Informally, a message is receivable in aether Ω if an agent
exists with a suitably typed input channel.
Definition 5 (Receivable, dangling message) A message k(v) is receivable iff:
∃ a, t,Θi . a[kι:<t>] ∈ Ω ∧ [[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi).
A message is dangling if it is not receivable.
We are interested in systems in which only receivable messages are sent. to this end, we
use a notion of interface consistency that ensures that agent interfaces are appropriately typed.
Interface consistency states that all messages sent on an output channel are receivable on a
corresponding input channel modulo subtyping, a condition similar to type-based interface com-
patibility for software components [13]. The principle is that the type of an output channel must
be a supertype of its declared input channel.
Definition 6 (Interface Consistency)
∀ a, σ, I . a[σ][I] ∈ Ω ∧ ∀ k, t . ko: t ∈ I =⇒
∃ a′, σ′, I ′ . a′[σ′][I ′] ∈ Ω ∧ ∃ t′ . kι: t′ ∈ I ′ ∧ (a 6= a′) ∧ (t′ ≤ t)
In order to avoid dangling messages, we add static and dynamic type checks to the original
aether reduction rules of Fig. 5. First, a static check evaluates interface consistency for each
process: each output channel declared must be associated to a corresponding input channel.
Second, two dynamic checks are added to the communication rules [OUT] and [IN]. They ensure
that the emitted value and the received value are well-typed. Moreover, they allow the type of the
discovered channels to be correctly inferred at the receiving site. Dynamic checking is required
since we are orchestration independent. In case we assume a particular type safe orchestration
language this checking can be statically ensured.
The corresponding modified communication rules [OUT] and [IN] are given in Fig. 9. Let Θe
be the local context of an emitter agent, v the emitted value, t the type of information of the
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[OUT] a[k
o(v)] , a[ko:<t>] , a[Θe] −→ k(v) , a[ko:<t>] , a[Θe]
[[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi) ,Θe ≤ Θi
[IN] k(v) , a[k
ι:<t>] , a[Θe] −→ a[kι(v)] , a[kι:<t>] , a[Θe ∧ Θi]
[[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi)
Figure 9: Communication with type inference
ae
Θe(k) ≤ Θi([[ t; v ]])(k)
< t >
ar
< r >
Θi([[ t; v ]])(k) ≤ Θi([[ r; v ]])(k)
ad k : td
t ≤ r
Θe(k) ≥ td
Θi([[ r; v ]])(k) ≥ td
Figure 10: Interface consistency preservation
outgoing channel. At emission time, the emitter uses its local context to check the type of the
emitted value before putting it on the out channel. This checking is performed by first inferring Θi
and then checking the subtype relation with Θe. More formally, [[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi) ∧ Θe ≤ Θi.
At receipt, the agent will infer a context and add it to its local context. However, it can type
new channel as well as existing channel values. Thus we add the condition [[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi)
and the new channel context is Θe ∧ Θi. Note that these rules require the use of an explicit
channel type to perform the communication.
These communication rules with typing conditions ensure interface consistency in the presence
of channel discovery.
Proposition 6 (Interface consistency invariant) Interface consistency is preserved by chan-
nel discovery at receipt.
Proof. Fig 10 describes the general case related to the interface consistency preservation. Con-
sider that ae emits a well typed message with value v which contains a channel k known or
unknown by the receiver agent ar. At receipt we assume that inference succeeds. If k /∈ dom(Θi)
is not discovered by the receiver agent then interface consistency is preserved. If k is defined at
receiver side (k ∈ dom(Θi)), the property 5 implies that it is also defined at the emitter side and
with a smaller type.
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At emission, the type of k is provided by the local context Θe of the emitter agent ae. The
interface consistency property states that this channel was defined by a, possibly different, agent
ad as a channel with type Θe(k) ≥ td. Let t be the type of this message and Θi([[ t; v ]])(k)
the inferred type of the transmitted channel. From the checking conditions in rule [OUT] we
have the constraint Θi([[ t; v ]])(k) ≥ Θe(k). The type of the message received by ar is r,
but interface consistency and channel contravariance imply that t ≤ r. At reception time at
ar, the type inference mechanism initially tags the transmitted channel with, yet another, type
Θi([[ r; v ]])(k). By the monotonicity property of our type inference algorithm, see Property 5,
Θi([[ r; v ]])(k) ≥ Θi([[ t; v ]])(k) follows. This channel may be new to ar or it may be already
known (k ∈ dom(Θe)); in the latter case tk ≥ td holds because of interface consistency. The
channel k was defined by ad and we have either Θi([[ r; v ]])(k) ≥ td or (Θi([[ r; v ]])(k) ∧ tk) ≥ td
thus interface consistency is satisfied for the channel k for agent ar. 
Finally, our system enjoys a type soundness that ensures that every message in transit is
receivable, which, in turn, entails progress and preservation of message-oriented service interac-
tions.
Theorem 3 (Type soundness) If processes are well-formed and interfaces consistent, the fol-
lowing property holds:
∀ k, v . k(v) ∈ Ω =⇒ k(v) is receivable.
Proof. The proof relies on two invariants of the aether: process well-formedness and interface
consistency. The proof that processes remain well-formed is trivial and preservation of the second
invariant follows from Prop. 6. Consider a message k(v) that is in transit: it has been inserted in
the aether using the [OUT] rule. There is a channel with type ko:<te> and the message was thus
type checked within the context of the emitter, i.e., [[ te; v ]] = (true,Θi). Due to the interface
consistency invariant, there is an input channel ar[kι:<tr>] and contravariance of channel types
implies te ≤ tr, thus we have [[ tr; v ]] = (true,Θi) from Prop. 3. The message is thus receivable
according to Def. 5. 
4.2 Weak message authentication
We now consider an extension of our typing scheme to aethers that may contain uncontrolled
agents and monitors (monitors are always trusted). We strive for a provably correct authentica-
tion mechanism for systems involving uncontrolled and controlled agents. We consider a weak
message authentication mechanism3 that only enables the status (monitored or not) of each
message emitter to be ascertained.
In order to formulate authentication properties, we distinguish between emitted and received
messages. In general, messages may be of very different forms because various pieces of infor-
mation may be added for authentication purposes and uncontrolled agents can forge any kinds
of message. However, we can limit ourselves to messages that are of the following two forms: i)
outgoing messages: k(v, n, sv), and ii) incoming messages: k(v, b), where v is a value, b a boolean
indicating the status of the emitter (monitored or not), n a nonce and sv a tag (a sticky value).
A monitor strictly respects the message format but an uncontrolled agent may not. Any message
which does not conform to the above format is simply removed from the solution.
In the following, we develop the authentication mechanism in two steps, first considering
systems that only use secure channels and then presenting the general case that includes insecure
channels.
3More precisely, we support data origin authentication [10] that guarantees integrity of the origin of messages
and their uniqueness.
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[OUT]M→M a[k
o(v)] , a[ko:<t>] , a[Θe] −→ k(v,_, s)true , a[ko:<t>] , a[Θe]
a ∈M ,[[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi) ,Θe ≤ Θi
[OUT]M→U a[k
o(v)] , a[ko:<t>] , a[Θe] −→ k(v,_,⊥)true , a[ko:<t>] , a[Θe]
a ∈M ,[[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi) ,Θe ≤ Θi
[IN]M→M k(v,_, s)
true , a[kι:<t>] −→ a[kι(v, true)true] , a[kι:<t>]
a[Θe] a[Θe ∧ Θi]
a ∈M ,[[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi)
[IN]U→M k(v,_,⊥)false , a[kι:<t>] −→ a[kι(v, false)false ] , a[kι:<t>]
a ∈M
Figure 11: Secure channels, monitors
[OUT]U→∗ a[∗o(∗)] −→ ∗(∗)false
a ∈ U
[IN]∗→U ∗(∗)true|false −→ a[∗ι(∗)true|false ]
a ∈ U
Figure 12: Secure channels, uncontrolled agents
4.2.1 Systems with secure channels only
As a first step we consider systems in which all channels are secure and do not modify messages.
The weak authentication protocol is defined in terms of the monitors (set M) and the uncon-
trolled agents (set U) by the rules respectively given in Figures 11 and 12. Uncontrolled agents
may modify messages (we denote such messages using the notation ∗(∗)): their values, channels
and argument values may change arbitrarily. Furthermore, we assume that an uncontrolled agent
knows all the provided channels in the aether. Since all channels are secure, nonces are not used
in this step.
Monitors share a secret s information, which is assumed to be computation-resistant [10]. At
each instant a monitor can use s in its messages, but other agents cannot use it and furthermore
they cannot compute it from the received information. The set of tag values is defined as
TagV alue = {s} + {⊥}. In Figure 11, four rules define the new behavior of a monitor when
sending messages to, or receiving messages from, other monitors or uncontrolled agents (M and
U in the rule names). The first modification is that a message from a monitor to a monitor
incorporates the secret, and at receipt by a monitor the presence of the secret is checked.
To prove the correctness of this authentication scheme we have to compare the status in-
ferred from the checking of the secret, i.e., the status component in the messages, with the true
status of the emitter, i.e., the superscript boolean values. All messages, emitted and received
ones, are annotated either with true denoting a controlled emitter or false that characterizes an
uncontrolled one.
Hence, the rules take into account the status computation as follows: i) [OUT]M→∗ the
status of the emitted message is true since the emitter is a monitor, ii) [OUT]U→∗ the status
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of the emitted message is false, and iii) [IN]∗→∗ keep the status of the received message.
Informally, correctness of the authentication scheme is defined by the following property: for
each message received from a monitor, the real status is the same as the computed one.
Theorem 4 (Weak Message Authentication)
∀ a ∈M . ∀ k, v, b, r, st . a[kι(v, b)st] ∈ Ω =⇒ b = st
Proof. The authentication protocol is expressed by the rules in Figures 11 and 12. Considering
the incoming message a[kι(v, b)st], where a ∈ M, two subcases have to be handled depending
on the value of b. If b = true then the message was received according to the rule [IN]M→M
and the transmitted message was k(v, n, s)st with ¬(s = ⊥). The only applicable rule then is
[OUT]M→M, the emitter was a monitor and st = true. If b = false then the rule [IN]U→M was
used, and the rule [OUT]U→M emitted the message, thus st = false. 
4.2.2 Systems with insecure channels
We now generalize the authentication scheme to systems with insecure channels. An insecure
channel between two monitors is equivalent to the transmission of messages via uncontrolled
agents which act as malicious routers. The challenge is to force the uncontrolled agents to act
with integrity. When a message from a monitor reaches an uncontrolled agent, the latter may
suppress it or send another message to monitors or uncontrolled agents. We use hash keys in
messages to be able to detect modifications to messages. The behavior of monitors has to be
extended so that messages going to or coming from uncontrolled agents are checked for integrity
violations. We also need to review the status computation. The new rules should express the
specific behavior of routers, which are not controlled but: i) receive messages with correct hash
keys from monitors, and ii) if the hash key is copied with the right values, the status component
of the outgoing message is the true status, or else it is false. We use nonces to avoid that a same
message will be received several times. Otherwise, agents could replay messages. This implies
that the syntax definition has to be modified: emitted messages now have a mandatory integer
argument for nonces. Furthermore, the context of an agent stores the known channels with their
nonces.
We assume that monitors share a secret cryptographic function making the secrets unforgeable
by uncontrolled agents. We need to distinguish the hashed values from the secret s and ⊥. The
set of tag values is thus redefined to TagV alue = {⊥} + {s} + range(H). Figure 13 adds two
new rules related to insecure message transit and replaces the previous rules for uncontrolled
agents, see Figure 12, to take into account the modified status computation.
Rule [OUT]M→U allows a monitor a to send a message to another monitor m via an un-
controlled agent r owning the channel kr. To do this a hash value H(v, k, n) is added to the
message. Rule [IN]U→M formalizes the case where the hash key value received by a monitor is
compliant with the channel k, the value v and the nonce n. Rule [OUT]U→∗ specifies that the
original emitter was a monitor if the hash value is correct. The remaining rules are immediate.
The correctness of the extended authentication scheme is formulated as a theorem analogous
to the first scheme for secure channels. Its proof has to take into account that messages may be
forwarded by uncontrolled routers, see Figures 11 and 13. Hence, it is possible that messages
with hash keys are routed in complex manners within the uncontrolled world. However, each
sequence resulting from such message routing is finite and starts from a monitor.
Proposition 7 (Routing Control) Any message sequence in the aether ∀ ki(vi, ni, Hi) that is
temporally ordered, such that ∃H . ∀ i . Hi = H, and that ends in a monitor, i.e., a controlled
agent, is finite and starts from a monitor.
Inria
Well-Typed Services Cannot Go Wrong 19
[OUT]M→U a[k
o(v)] , a[ko:<t>, (n)] , −→ kr(v, n, H(v, k, n))true , a[ko:<t>, (n+ 1)] ,
a[kr
o:<tr>] , a[Θe] , a[kr
o:<tr>] , a[Θe] ,
r[kr
ι:<tr>] ,m[k
ι:<tm>] r[kr
ι:<tr>] ,m[k
ι:<tm>]
a,m ∈M , r ∈ U ,[[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi) ,Θe ≤ Θi
[IN]U→M k(v, n, H(v, n, k))
true , −→ a[kι(v, true))true ] ,
a[kι:<t>, (N)] , a[Θe] a[k
ι:<t>, (N ∪ {n})] , a[Θe ∧ Θi]
a ∈M , n /∈ N ,[[ t; v ]] = (true,Θi)
[IN]U→M k(v, n, h)
false −→ a[kι(v, false)false ]
a ∈M ,¬(h = H(v, n, k))
[OUT]U→∗ a[∗o(∗)] −→ k(∗)h=H(v,n,k)
a ∈ U
[IN]∗→U k(∗)true|false −→ a[∗ι(∗)true|false ]
a ∈ U
Figure 13: Weak Message Authentication Rules – Insecure Channels
Proof. If such a message reaches a monitor then it comes from an uncontrolled agent, since
monitors are trustable and cannot send hash key values to other monitors. Now if an uncontrolled
agent has received a hash key value it comes in one step from a monitor or it comes from
another uncontrolled agent. Hash key values are not forgeable by uncontrolled agents, agents
can only pass them to others. Any hashed message has to be initially emitted from a monitor
and intermediate nodes cannot forge but always relay the hash value. 
A consequence is that all the messages in the sequence have status true. Furthermore, messages
with hash key are received at most once due to the nonce mechanism. Overall, this scheme
amounts to the use of so-called time-variant parameters [10].
While weak mesage authentication (Theorem 4) still holds in the presence of uncontrolled
agents, its proof has to be adapted.
Proof. (of Theorem 4 in the presence of uncontrolled agents)
Consider a message that enters a monitor a[kι(v, b)st], where a ∈M, k ∈ K(a).
• If b = true the accepting rule was [IN]M→M and we are in the same situation as with
only secure channels. The accepting rule might also have been [IN]U→M. In this case the
monitor receives a correct hashed key message k(v, n, H(v, n, k)). Property 7 states that
the original hash value was emitted by a monitor and the status is true.
• If b = false either the rule was [IN]U→M but this rule exists in two instances: one with
⊥ and the other with a hash key h. The first case is the same as above without insecure
channel. In the second case h is not a correct hash key value, thus it was put in the aether
by [OUT]U→∗ and then the status is false.

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4.3 Type soundness
In the previous section we have introduced two kinds of attackers: uncontrolled agents and
insecure channels. A countermeasure to possible attacks on types is to add control at reception
time during channel discovery.
Definition 7 (Origin-check) At message reception time, the type inference mechanism checks
the origin of each message (using weak message authentication). If the message was sent by an
uncontrolled agent, no discovery of channels is allowed.
This countermeasure is formalized in the rules [IN]U→M in Figures 11 and 13. When the
computed status is false, no channel discovery is performed.
Theorem 5 (Type soundness with attackers) In presence of uncontrolled agents and inse-
cure channels, the origin-check countermeasure ensures that messages in transit that have been
sent by a monitor are receivable.
Proof. The proof is similar to the previous one in the setting of controlled agents and channels 4.1.
In the context of insecure channels, the well-formedness invariant still holds but we have to review
the interface consistency invariant because interface consistency can be broken by an attacker.
However, the origin-check ensures that channel discovery is modified so that interface consistency
is preserved. At message receipt, if authentication fails, no discovery is performed for channel
values in the message thus interface consistency remains valid. 
Our type system supports the dynamic creation of new channels since it can be viewed as a
channel discovery mechanism.
5 Related Work
We are not the first to advocate typing support in SOAs. The need for sophisticated service
discovery, in particular supported by a sound type system with subtyping, has been advocated
by Kourtesis and Paraskakis [6]. In a related context, testing for subschema relationships of
XML Schemas is known as strong requirement for service interoperability [8].
A wide variety of formal models exists for service-oriented computing. There are principally
two kinds of formalization: process calculus models for expressing and analyzing service based-
systems [14] and formal models of standard orchestration languages (e.g., BPEL [9]). These
orchestration models are less abstract than our black box approach: they require to detail the
service implementations while our approach is language and network independent.
There are only few references discussing type checking in the context of web services. Pu [11]
defines a type system for semi-structured data with applications to a wide range of data models
and query systems: relational data bases, XML documents, web services, etc. The type system
is based on a nested record type system with collection and universal polymorphism. This type
system is neither recursive nor does it allow channel mobility; its checking algorithm is expensive
even in this restricted setting. Sans and Cervesato [12] deal with an abstract model that covers
code mobility which we do not address, we are only concerned with remote procedure calls. On
the other hand, they consider functions rather than channels and they do not support sum types,
nor recursive types. They require a centralized typing table collecting types of services published
everywhere in the Internet and assume that this repository can be trusted. A distributed and
typed pi-calculus for mobile agents is described in [5]. The type system considers malicious agents
with erroneous types. Type safety is enforced by dynamically type checking agents when they
enter a site. In contrast to our work they do not consider channel discovery or subtyping.
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The principle of semantic subtyping is nicely presented in [4]. Semantic subtyping simplify
the type systems: there is no need of syntactic normal form, and any set operation, for instance
negation, can be integrated smoothly in the type language. Moreover, subtyping is directly
interpreted as set inclusion. Our work directly exploit these results. We have still to study how
their optimizations of the typing algorithm as done in the CDuce language can be translated into
our system. Another way to optimize the algorithm has been proposed by Carpineti and Laneve
[3].
6 Conclusion
SOAs are frequently used in highly dynamic environments, in particular because of the use of
dynamic service discovery. Formal guarantees of properties over service compositions, notably
in terms of type systems, are very useful in this context. However, few type systems for services
have been put forward, frequently used infrastructures provide only minimal typing guarantees,
and no existing type system support advanced features such dynamic service discovery in the
presence of contravariant channels.
In this article, we have motivated the need for an advanced type system for web services.
We have introduced a high level chemical semantics for service interactions and dynamic ser-
vice discovery with first-class channels. The resulting system supports contravariant types for
channels and type interference. We have formally shown fundamental correctness properties of
the type system and shown how to apply it to make SOA safer and more secure. Our formal
model allows the type-checking of messages and message authentication with both secure and
insecure channels. Finally, we have formally proven different type-related properties of service
interactions.
In the context of the CESSA research project, we plan to integrate such a type system into
existing web service engines, use it to make the evolution of service systems and to generate
execution monitors in order to secure web-applications.
A Proofs
Proposition 8 (Equivalence of type inference and checking)
∀v, t . succeed([[ t; v ]]) ⇐⇒ ∃Γ . Γ ` v S t
Terminology : in order to simplify the formulation of the proofs, we devolve terms introduced for
type inference to type checking: in the following we say that “type checking succeeds” for value v
and type t if v S t can be derived using the type system of Fig. 6; conversely, we say that “type
checking fails” if such a relation cannot be derived.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the type arguments (the lines in Fig. 8) and value
arguments (the columns in the figure).
• Case t = B:
– If v = b then type inference and checking succeed iff b ∈ B, the latter because of rule
Base1.
– If v = k then inference fails; furthermore, ¬(k S B) can be derived because of Base2
– If v = l[v1], v2 then inference fails and v does not type check because of Base2.
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• Case t = ¬B:
Inference succeeds iff v /∈ B; for type checking, Not1, Base2 imply v S ¬B is also
equivalent to v /∈ B.
• Case t =< t1 >:
– If v = b, type inference and checking fail, the latter because of Ch3.
– Inferring v = k against < t1 > always succeeds. If k S < t1 > then t1 ≤ Γ(k) is a
necessary and sufficient condition and thus Γ exists.
– If v = l[v1], v2, type inference and checking fail, the latter because of Ch3.
• Case t = ¬ < t1 >:
– If v = b, inference and checking fail, the letter because Not1, Ch3 imply v S¯ ¬ < t1 >
is equivalent to b /∈ k.
– Inference of k against ¬ < t1 > always succeeds. Type checking succeeds as well
because k S ¬ < t1 > is equivalent to k S¯ < t1 > which is equivalent to ¬(t1 ≤ Γ(k))
from the Ch2 rule.
– If v = l[v1], v2, inference and checking fail, the latter becauseNot1, Ch3 imply l[v1], v2 S ¬ <
t1 > is equivalent to l[v1], v2 /∈ k.
• Case t = l[t1], t2:
– If v = b or v = k, inference and checking fail, the latter because of Lab4 in both cases.
– If v = l[v1], v2, inference succeeds iff (l = l′ ∧ succeed([[ t1; v1 ]]) ∧ succeed([[ t2; v2 ]])).
As to type checking, Lab1 yields l[v1], v2 S l′[t1], t2 which is equivalent to (l = l′ ∧
succeed([[ t1; v1 ]]) ∧ succeed([[ t2; v2 ]])).
• Case ¬l[t′1], t′2:
– If v = b or v = k, inference and checking succeed, the latter because of Not1, Lab4 in
both cases.
– If v = l[v1], v2, inference succeeds iff (¬l = l′+succeed([[¬t1; v1 ]])+succeed([[¬t2; v2 ]]));
as to type checking, Not1, Lab2, Lab3, Lab4 imply l[v1], v2 S ¬l[t′1], t′2, which is equiv-
alent to l 6= l′+ succeed([[¬t1; v1 ]]) + succeed([[¬t2; v2 ]])).
• Case ¬¬t′ is satisfied by induction on t′ and rules Not1 and Not2.
• Cases + and ∧ and their negations follow from De Morgan’s laws, induction hypothesis
and rules for union and intersection of sets.
• The recursion cases (operator µ) are proven by induction provided that the function ter-
minates which is the case from Prop. 1.

Proposition 9 (Monotonicity of inference w.r.t. subtyping)
∀t, r, v . (t ≤ r ∧ succeed([[ t; v ]])) =⇒ (context([[ t; v ]]) ≤ context([[ r; v ]]))
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Proof. From property 3 we know that the conditions imply succeed([[ r; v ]]). We consider
induction on type r, and note Θt the inferred context for type t and value v. We need a lemma
about intersection in the context defined by the proposition.
t1 ∧ t2 ≤ r =⇒ Θt1 ∧ Θt2 ≤ Θr (5)
The property can be proved as follows. We have t1 ∧ t2 ≤ r this is equivalent to t1 ∧ t2 =
(t1 ∧ r) ∧ (t2 ∧ r), since inference succeeds for t1 ∧ t2 and r we have Θt1 ∧ t2 = Θt1 ∧ Θt2 =
Θt1 ∧ r ∧ Θt2 ∧ r. That means both part should succeed for inference. We have t1 ∧ r ≤ r
and t2 ∧ r ≤ r thus induction applies and we get Θt1 ∧ Θt2 ≤ Θr.
• Case r = B1: Then v = b and inferred contexts are equal and empty.
• Case r = ¬B1: Then if v = b, for all t ≤ r the inferred contexts are empty. If v = k the
contexts verify Θt(k) = t ≤ Θr(k) = r. If v = l[v1], v2 then we should look at the various
cases for t:
– Case t = B: Inference fails with v.
– Case t = ¬B: Inference with v and t succeeds with >v, this is also true for r and v.
– Case t = < t1 >: Inference fails with v.
– Case t = ¬ < t1 >: Inference with v and t succeeds with >v, this is also true for r
and v.
– Case t = l′[t1], t2: Inference succeeds with l = l′ and Θt = context([[ r; v1 ]]) ∧
context([[ r; v2 ]]) or it fails with an empty context, but in both cases Θt ≤ >v.
– Case t = ¬l′[t1], t2: There are two cases depending on the test l = l′ and Θt ≤ >v.
– Case t = ¬¬t1: Recursion with t1 ≤ r1.
– Case t = t1 + t2: Recursion with t1 ≤ r ∧ t2 ≤ r.
– Case t = ¬(t1 + t2): Use de Morgan’s laws and induction.
– Case t = t1 ∧ t2: Use property 5.
– Case t = ¬(t1 ∧ t2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
– Case t = µX . t1: Recursion with un(µX . t1).
– Case t = ¬µX . t1: Recursion with ¬un(µX . t1)
• Case r = < r1 >: Then v = k, Θr(k) = r and Θt(k) = t (from proposition 4) thus
subtyping is true.
• Case r = ¬ < r1 >: Then if v = b the contexts are empty. If v = k the contexts verify
Θt(k) = t ≤ Θr(k) = r. If v = l[v1], v2, then Θr = >v, we should look at t:
– Case t = B: Inference fails with v.
– Case t = ¬B: Inference with v and t succeeds with >v.
– Case t = < t1 >: Inference fails with v.
– Case t = ¬ < t1 >: Inference with v and t succeeds with >v.
– Case t = l′[t1], t2: Inference succeeds with l = l′ and Θt = context([[ r; v1 ]]) ∧
context([[ r; v2 ]]) or it fails with an empty context, but in both cases Θt ≤ >v.
– Case t = ¬l′[t1], t2: There are two cases depending on the test l = l′ and Θt ≤ >v.
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– Case t = ¬¬t1: Recursion with t1 ≤ r1.
– Case t = t1 + t2: Recursion with t1 ≤ r ∧ t2 ≤ r.
– Case t = ¬(t1 + t2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
– Case t = t1 ∧ t2: Use property 5.
– Case t = ¬(t1 ∧ t2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
– Case t = µX . t1: Recursion with un(µX . t1).
– Case t = ¬µX . t1: Recursion with ¬un(µX . t1)
• Case r = l[r1], r2: Then v = l[v1], v2 and Θr = context([[ r1; v1 ]]) ∧ context([[ r2; v2 ]]), we
look at t:
– Case t = B: No subtyping.
– Case t = ¬B: No subtyping.
– Case t = < t1 >: No subtyping.
– Case t = ¬ < t1 >: No subtyping.
– Case t = l[t1], t2: We get Θt = context([[ t1; v1 ]]) ∧ context([[ t2; v2 ]]) and we get
Θt ≤ Θr.
– Case t = ¬l[t1], t2: No subtyping.
– Case t = ¬¬t1: Recursion with t1 ≤ r1.
– Case t = t1 + t2: Recursion with t1 ≤ r ∧ t2 ≤ r.
– Case t = ¬(t1 + t2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
– Case t = t1 ∧ t2: Use property 5.
– Case t = ¬(t1 ∧ t2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
– Case t = µX . t1: Recursion with un(µX . t1).
– Case t = ¬µX . t1: Recursion with ¬un(µX . t1)
• Case r = ¬l′[r1], r2:
– Case t = B: Then v = b and inferred contexts are empty.
– Case t = ¬B: No subtyping.
– Case t = < t1 >: Then v = k and context subtyping is true.
– Case t = ¬ < t1 >: No subtyping.
– Case t = l[t1], t2: Then v = l[v1], v2 and Θt = context([[ t1; v1 ]]) ∧ context([[ t2; v2 ]]).
If l 6= l′ we have Θt ≤ >v. Else we have either t1 ≤ ¬r1 ∧ t2 ≤ r2 or
t1 ≤ r1 ∧ t2 ≤ ¬r2 and Θr = context([[¬r1; v1 ]]) + context([[¬r2; v2 ]]). In the first
case by induction we have context([[ t1; v1 ]]) ≤ context([[¬r1; v1 ]]) thus Θt ≤ Θr.
The second case is symmetric.
– Case t = ¬l[t1], t2: From subtyping relations we get l = l′ ∧ r1 ≤ t1 ∧ r2 ≤ t2
thus l = l′. For the case v = b we get empty contexts. If v = k then we have
Θt = t ≤ Θr = r. If v = l”[v1], v2 then:
∗ If l 6= l”: then Θt = >v
· l = l′ then l” 6= l′ and Θr = >v and context subtyping is true.
∗ Else l = l” then Θt = context([[¬t1; v1 ]]) + context([[¬t2; v2 ]])
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· l = l′ then l” = l′ and then Θr = context([[¬r1; v1 ]]) + context([[¬r2; v2 ]]).
From subtyping we have r1 ≤ t1 ∧ r2 ≤ t2 which is equivalent to
¬t1 ≤ ¬r1 ∧ ¬t2 ≤ ¬r2. We have three cases: only [[¬t1; v1 ]] succeeds,
or only [[¬t2; v2 ]] succeeds or both succeed. We consider the first case, from
¬t1 ≤ ¬r1 we apply induction hypothesis and we have context([[¬t1; v1 ]]) ≤
context([[¬r1; v1 ]]) ≤ Θr. The second case is symmetric. If both succeed
we also get the subtyping relation from induction hypothesis.
– Case t = ¬¬t1: Recursion with t1 ≤ r1.
– Case t = t1 + t2: Recursion with t1 ≤ r ∧ t2 ≤ r.
– Case t = ¬(t1 + t2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
– Case t = t1 ∧ t2: Use property 5.
– Case t = ¬(t1 ∧ t2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
– Case t = µX . t1: Recursion with un(µX . t1).
– Case t = ¬µX . t1: Recursion with ¬un(µX . t1)
• Case r = ¬¬r1: Recursion with t ≤ r1.
• Case r = r1+r2: Then Θr = Θr1+Θr2 , since t ≤ r1+r2 it is equivalent to t = t ∧ r1+t ∧ r2
then Θt = Θt ∧ r1 +Θt ∧ r2 . We should consider the three cases corresponding to the succes
of checking on one part only part or on both parts of t. Since t ∧ r1 ≤ r1 and t ∧ r2 ≤ r2
we can apply induction hypothesis on one expression or both and Θt ≤ Θr.
• Case r = ¬(r1 + r2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
• Case r = r1 ∧ r2: Recursion with t ≤ r1 ∧ t ≤ r2.
• Case r = ¬(r1 ∧ r2): Use de Morgan’s laws.
• Case r = µX . r1: Recursion with un(µX . t1).
• Case r = ¬µX . r1: Recursion with ¬un(µX . t1)

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